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Abstract
Experience in one product market can potentially improve ﬁrm performance in a re-
lated product market in the future. Thus, entry into a market is determined not just
by proﬁts in that market but also by its future impact on proﬁtability in other markets.
We formulate and estimate a dynamic model of entry decisions of ﬁrms in the presence
of such spillovers using data on the generic drug industry. Spillovers imply that a ﬁrm’s
unobserved “ability” to proﬁt in a product market not only changes stochastically but
is also is endogenous to past entry decisions. Therefore, the model needs to accom-
modate unobserved state variables that are endogenous to ﬁrm actions and serially
correlated. We address the methodological challenge of estimating such a model us-
ing a sequential importance sampling based technique. Our estimates show signiﬁcant
spillover eﬀects of entry on future proﬁts. On average, each entry reduces costs by 7%
at the next entry opportunity. On average there are eight entry opportunities annually.
The average cumulative beneﬁt of a ﬁrm that enters all eight markets in a year is 51%.
We conclude that spillovers are critical in the equilibrium evolution of the structure of
the generic drug industry.
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11 Introduction
One of the most signiﬁcant decisions a ﬁrm makes is whether or not to introduce a new
product. These entry decisions of ﬁrms in a forward looking dynamic environment are
drastically diﬀerent from those in a static competitive environment. In a dynamic setting,
current entry may have a spillover eﬀect on future entry. This is because a ﬁrm’s experience
in one product market may potential improve its performance in a related product market
in the future. Consequently, a ﬁrm’s decision to enter a product market is determined not
just by expected proﬁts in that market but also by the eﬀect of the current entry decision on
future proﬁtability in other product markets. In this paper we analyze the dynamic entry
decisions of forward looking ﬁrms in order to evaluate the eﬀects of current experience on
future market performance. In order to do this we formulate and estimate a dynamic game
theoretic model of entry decisions of ﬁrms in the presence of such cross product spillovers
using data on the generic drug industry.
In the case of a generic pharmaceutical ﬁrm there can be economies of scope that come
from experience working with a particular ingredient, therapeutic class, or form of drug (e.g.,
oral liquid or liquid injectable). Hence, a ﬁrm might enter a particular product market even
if the current opportunity is not proﬁtable as long as the spillovers from entry suﬃciently
improve the discounted stream of cumulative future proﬁts. The model incorporates such dy-
namic spillovers from experience due to entry on future costs. It allows for serially correlated
ﬁrm speciﬁc costs that evolve endogenously based on past entry decisions. Furthermore, en-
dogeneity of costs to past entry decisions induces heterogeneity among ﬁrms even if they are
identical ex ante, which they need not be. Starting with innovative work of Bresnahan and
Reiss (1991a), there is a considerable, and growing literature on estimating games of entry
(e.g., Berry (1992), Scott-Morton (1999), Mazzeo (2002), Seim (2006), Orhun (2006), Zhu
and Singh (2006), Jia (2008), Vitorino (2008)). However, there is almost no research that
examines the dynamic spillover eﬀects of entry on future ﬁrm performance.
Spillovers imply that a ﬁrm’s unobserved “ability” to proﬁt in a product market not
only changes stochastically but is also is endogenous to past entry decisions. Therefore,
the model needs to accommodate unobserved state variables that are endogenous to ﬁrm
2actions and serially correlated. We address the methodological challenge of estimating such
a model using a sequential importance sampling based technique. Although, there have been
substantial recent developments in the empirical literature on estimation of dynamic games,
incorporating unobserved (to the researcher) state variables that are serially correlated and
endogenous remains prohibitively diﬃcult.1 Our work is related to the seminal paper by
Keane (1994) that used sequential importance sampling to develop a computationally fea-
sible simulation based estimator for limited dependent variable panel data models in the
presence of serially correlated errors.2 A special case of that estimator is the well-known
Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane (GHK) estimator (see e.g., Hajivassiliou, McFadden, and Ruud
(1996), Geweke and Keane (2001)) that arises for a particular choice of importance sampling
densities.
Our paper provides evidence on the dynamic spillover eﬀects of experience in one product
market on subsequent performance in the market for another product. In spite of a fairly
extensive theoretical literature (see e.g., Spence (1981), Fudenberg and Tirole (1983), Cabral
and Riordan (1994)) on the dynamic strategic eﬀects of past industry experience there is
very little empirical examination of such spillovers in a dynamic oligopolistic context. An
exception is the work of Benkard (2004) on the role of learning by doing in a in the aircraft
industry.3 Whereas Benkard (2004) focuses on the eﬀects of experience within a particular
product we study the cross product eﬀects of experience.
We estimate the model parameters using Bayesian MCMC methods. Our estimates show
signiﬁcant spillover eﬀects of entry on future proﬁts. On average, each entry reduces costs by
7% at the next entry opportunity. On average there are eight entry opportunities annually.
The average cumulative beneﬁt of a ﬁrm that enters all eight markets in a year is 51%. We
1See Aguirregabiria and Mira (2009) for a recent survey of the literature on dynamic models of strategic
interactions. Other excellent surveys of discrete games of entry are Berry and Reiss (2007) and Berry and
Tamer (2006).
2Ackerberg (2009) has developed a method for using importance sampling coupled with a change of
variables technique to provide computational gains in estimating game theoretic and dynamic discrete choice
models.
3Our paper diﬀers from Benkard’s analysis in two important ways: (i) we allow for the payoﬀs to be
aﬀected by serially correlated unobserved endogenous state variables (i.e., ﬁrm speciﬁc costs). This in turn
requires us to (ii) compute and impose the equilibrium conditions of the dynamic game when estimating
the spillover eﬀects. In contrast to spillovers within a ﬁrm, Xu (2008) examines the spillover eﬀects on a
ﬁrm’s productivity of its competitors’ R&D in a dynamic oligopolistic framework using data from the Korean
electric motor industry.
3conclude that spillovers are critical in the equilibrium evolution of the structure of the generic
drug industry. Our methods are more generally applicable to estimating dynamic games in
which (i) the choice set is discrete in nature, e.g., entry and exit from industry, expansion
or reduction of product categories, introduction of new or discontinuation of old brands,
technology adoption or upgrades, relocation, start up or shut down decisions of stores, ﬁrms,
or factories etc, (ii) when there are serially correlated unobserved endogenous state variables,
and (iii) an algorithm to solve the game is available.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We begin by discussing the related literature
in Section 2. Section 3 describes the background and data and Section 4 the model. The
method used to solve the model is discussed in Section 5 and the estimation procedure in
Section 6. The results are presented in Section 8 and Section 9 concludes.
2 Related Literature
There is a growing literature on the estimation of games. Static games under the incomplete
information assumption have been studied by, e.g., Bjorn and Vuong (1984), Bresnahan and
Reiss (1991b), Bresnahan and Reiss (1991c), Haile, Horta¸ csu, and Kosenok (2008), Aradillas-
Lopez (2005), Ho (2009), Ishii (2005), Pakes, Porter, Ho, and Ishii (2005), Augereau, Green-
stein, and Rysman (2006), Seim (2006), Sweeting (2006), Tamer (2003), Manuszak and Co-
hen (2004), Rysman (2004), Gowrisankaran and Stavins (2004), Ellickson and Misra (2008)
and Bajari, Hong, Krainer, and Nekipelov (2006). Dynamic games of incomplete infor-
mation have been studied by, e.g., Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007), Bajari, Benkard, and
Levin (2004), Pakes, Ostrovsky, and Berry (2007), Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2003),
Ryan (2005), Collard-Wexler (2006), Bajari, Chernozhukov, Hong, and Nekipelov (2007) and
Gowrisankaran, Lucarelli, Schmidt-Dengler, and Town (2008). The literature on estimating
games of incomplete information has mostly relied on a two step estimation strategy building
on the Conditional Choice Probability (CCP) estimator of Hotz and Miller (1993).
The two step estimation strategy requires the assumption that there is no market or
ﬁrm level unobserved heterogeneity other than a random shock that is independent and
identically distributed across both time and players. This assumption is restrictive because
it rules out unobserved dynamics in the latent state variables. It also rules out any private
4information that a player might have about competing ﬁrms that the researcher does not
have. Arcidiacono and Miller (2008) have extended the literature on two step CCP estimation
of dynamic discrete models to allow for discrete forms of unobserved heterogeneity using the
EM algorithm. In contrast, our method is applicable even when the unobserved variable is
continuous. Moreover, while two step methods can be computationally attractive, we think
that a likelihood based method, as the one we are employing, has advantages when the model
is potentially misspeciﬁed. In this case, the likelihood based approach still minimizes a well
deﬁned Kullback-Leibler distance between the model and the data. On the other hand, it
is not clear whether two step methods minimize a well deﬁned distance between the model
and the data if the model is potentially misspeciﬁed.
Static games of complete information have been estimated by, e.g., Bresnahan and Reiss
(1991a), Berry (1992), Tamer (2003), Ciliberto and Tamer (2009) and Bajari, Hong, and
Ryan (2004). The complete information assumption allows substantial unobserved hetero-
geneity at the level of the ﬁrms. These games typically require the use of a combinatorial
algorithm to search for an equilibrium instead of the continuous ﬁxed point mapping used
in incomplete information models to compute equilibria. To our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst
to estimate a dynamic game of complete information.
In the single agent dynamic framework, there is a considerable amount of research that
allows for time invariant unobserved heterogeneity, e.g., Keane and Wolpin (1997). With very
few exceptions (e.g., Erdem and Keane (1996), Khwaja (2001)), there is almost no work that
allows for serially correlated unobserved endogenous state variables. Bayesian approaches for
single agent dynamic discrete choice models with unobserved state variables that are serially
correlated over time have been developed by Imai, Jain, and Ching (2005) and Norets (2009).
These papers use MCMC for integrating out the unobserved state variables. In contrast, we
use sequential importance sampling to integrate out the unobserved state variables and use
MCMC to iterate through the parameter space in estimating the model. In addition we are
the ﬁrst to apply this method to estimate a dynamic game whereas the previous literature
has focused on single agent models.
We use MCMC methods in estimating the model. In principle, we could use either
frequentist or Bayesian methods in the analysis because an MCMC chain can be used to
5compute the statistics that relate to either approach as shown by Chernozhukov and Hong
(2003). However, our likelihood is nonlinear and is not diﬀerentiable making it extremely
diﬃcult to compute and to conduct frequentist inference. Conversely, Bayesian inference is
both theoretically justiﬁed and computationally attractive under these conditions. Moreover,
Bayesian methods facilitate use of prior information for identiﬁcation. Therefore we apply
Bayesian methods in the application in this paper.
Our implementation makes use of a sequential importance sampler. Fernandez-Villaverde
and Rubio-Ramirez (2005) used sequential importance sampling methods for estimating
macroeconomic dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models. The structure of dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium models is closely related to that of dynamic discrete choice
models. However, the discrete outcome and game theoretic strategic interaction aspects of
our model are novel. Blevins (2008) used the bootstrap ﬁlter to allow for serially correlated
unobservable state variables in estimating dynamic single agent models, and dynamic games
of incomplete information in a revealed preference framework. In a continuous time set-
ting, Nekipelov (2007) developed a ﬂexible indirect inference estimator for continuous time
dynamic games in the context of eBay auctions without requiring the complete solution of
the dynamic game. This is a novel approach that has potential applications in dynamic
oligopolistic competition models.
3 Background and Data
Analysis of consumption and production decisions in the generic pharmaceutical ﬁrm in-
dustry has been an important topic of empirical research. Generic pharmaceutical sales in
the U.S. were valued at $58.5 billion in 2007. In the same year generics made up 65% of
all prescriptions in the U.S. Moreover, in 2007 generic equivalents existed for 8,730 of the
11,487 branded drugs approved by the FDA and listed in its “Orange Book.” In an impor-
tant paper Scott-Morton (1999) estimated a static entry model to show that entry can be
predicted by a ﬁrm’s organizational experience, size of the market and whether the entry
opportunity is similar to the ﬁrm’s existing portfolio of drugs. In subsequent work, Reiﬀen
and Ward (2005) provided evidence on various features of the industry such as: (i) prices of
generic drugs fall as the number of competitors increase but remain above long run marginal
6costs for less than eight entrants, (ii) greater number of ﬁrms enter larger markets, and (iii)
proﬁts ﬁrst increase for early entrants and then decline with more entry.
Crawford and Shum (2005) estimated a dynamic matching model of anti-ulcer drug choice
for forward looking consumers. They provided evidence of (i) signiﬁcant heterogeneity in
drug eﬃcacy across individuals and (ii) the beneﬁts of learning from personal experience
with drugs in dealing with uncertainty about eﬃcacy. Ching (2010) in an analysis based on
a dynamic random utility model of demand for prescription drugs found that after patent
expiration (i) the rise in prices of brand name drugs can be explained by heterogeneity in
consumer preferences, and (ii) the slow diﬀusion of generics into the market by consumer
learning about product quality. In a companion paper, Ching (2008) developed a ﬁnite
horizon dynamic4 oligopoly model to examine the eﬀect of reducing the approval times for
generics. Estimating the model using data on the anti-hypertension drug Clonidine he found
that although the policy change reduces the time to entry it also reduces the number of
generic entrants in equilibrium as there tends to be greater entry in the early periods which
decreases the average proﬁtability of ﬁrms. However, much remains to be understood about
the generic pharmaceutical industry, especially with regard to the entry decisions of ﬁrms
and whether past industry experience confers any strategic advantage when ﬁrms engage in
dynamic oligopolist competition.
In this paper we use the unique data assembled by Scott-Morton (1999) on the entry
decisions of generic drug manufacturers from 1984 to 1994.5 This time period is particularly
interesting because of the 1984 Waxman-Hatch Act which lowered barriers to entry for
generic ﬁrms by permitting Abbreviated New Drug Applications (ANDAs). This vastly
increased entry in to the generic market as it relaxed the requirements for generic ﬁrms to
gain FDA approval. Generic ﬁrms did not have to repeat all the tests that the manufacturer
of the pioneer branded product had undertaken but instead were only required to show that
the generic product was bioequivalent and had identical characteristics in strength, dosage
form and route. Also in 1989 there was a “generic scandal” in which some FDA reviewers
4Ching (2008) focuses on the dynamics of demand and supply over time within a product market. In
contrast we focus on the dynamics that come from spillovers across product markets.
5We are grateful to Fiona Scott Morton for providing us with her data, and to Derek Gurney for answering
our questions about the data.
7were caught accepting bribes to expedite ANDAs, and some ﬁrms were found to have used
the original branded drug in place of their own in the FDA review process. We refer the
reader to Scott-Morton (1999) for details of the data set and the institutional environment.
We summarize the facts relevant for our study here.
The preparation of an ANDA takes months to years because it requires construction of
manufacturing facilities that need to be inspected and approved by the FDA prior to launch
of full scale operations. The sunk cost of submitting an ANDA is high even though it is
much less than a new drug invention. For example, the average revenues for generic ﬁrms
in one-ﬁrm markets are $10 million, while the costs of submitting an ANDA can range from
$250,000 to $20 million (Scott-Morton (1999)). Furthermore, the size and heterogeneity of
entry cost relative to the size of market revenue lead to a small number of entrants supported
by each market. In addition, the FDA does not reveal when and from whom it receives ANDA
applications.
As discussed in Scott-Morton (1999), announced entry is very rare, because ﬁrms do not
want to signal the common market value. They also fear that the delay in the approval
will invite competition. There are few late sequential movers who withdraw in response to
rivals’ approvals. Simultaneous moves in a dynamic context are an important feature of
this industry. These features of the data are consistent with our modeling assumption of
a dynamic simultaneous entry game among a small number of competing pharmaceutical
ﬁrms in which ﬁrms have to face substantial competition when they incur the sunk cost of
entry.
The original data used by Scott-Morton (1999) consists of all ANDA approvals between
1984 and 1994. There is data on 1,233 ANDAs, and 363 markets entry opportunities for a
total of 123 ﬁrms. In constructing our estimation sample we use the following information
for each market opportunity: ANDA submission date, ANDA approval date, characteristics
of drug (i.e., ingredient, concentration, route, form), characteristics of drug markets (i.e.,
drug therapeutic class, patent expiration date, revenue of brand name drug the year before
expiration), characteristics of ﬁrms (i.e., parent or subsidiary ﬁrm, whether ﬁrm was indicted
in a bribery scandal).
Based on our model speciﬁcation and estimation strategy (described below) we only
8need information on total market revenues and entry decisions of potential entrants at each
market entry opportunity to recover the model parameters. In estimating the model we
focus on the period after the FDA bribery scandal in 1989 because of the general upheaval
and uncertainty in the generic drug industry surrounding the scandal period. We take great
care in processing the data between 1988 to 1993. We only study ANDAs for generic drugs
that are orally ingested in the form of pills. Thus, we focus on spillovers from experience in
producing drugs in the form of oral solids. In this category, for the sample period 1990-94,
there are 40 market openings for which there is no missing revenue information and 51 ﬁrms
who entered at least once. Each market category is deﬁned as a unique combination of
primary ingredient, patent expiration date and total revenue for the branded drug for the
last year before patent expiration.6 The top ten dominant ﬁrms in the sample after 1989 are
(in descending order of dominance): Mylan, Novopharm, Lemmon, Geneva, Copley, Roxane,
Purepac, Watson, Mutual and Lederle. The top ﬁrm, Mylan, entered 45% of the markets,
the top two 48%, the top three 55%, the top four 60%, the top ﬁve 65%, and the top ten
73%. Individually, Novopharm entered 28%, and Lemmon and Geneva entered 25% of the
markets.
In our analysis we consider situations where the potential entrants are the top three or
four ﬁrms. In each case the remaining ﬁrms are combined into a category referred to as
“other.” The fraction of the market allocated to “other” is taken as given and is anticipated
by the top ﬁrms when considering entry. The procedure we use to implement this is described
in Section 4. On average 3.3 ﬁrms enter a market, with the minimum number of entrants
being one and the maximum being nine ﬁrms. The mean revenue in thousands of dollars
is 126,901, the std. dev. is 161,580, the minimum is 72, and maximum is 614,593. In our
estimation we use the log of revenue and in that case the mean is 10.47, std. dev. is 2.1,
minimum is 4.3, and maximum is 13.3.
Table 1 about here
6Some amount of hand editing was required in constructing the sample, e.g., when the revenue number
was diﬀerent due to rounding error or there was a spelling error in the primary ingredient of the drug.
94 Model
In this section we formally describe the dynamic oligopolistic game of entry. Firms maximize
proﬁts over an inﬁnite horizon t = 1,...,∞, where each time the market is open counts as
one time increment. A market opening is deﬁned to be an entry opportunity that becomes
available to generic manufacturers each time a branded product goes oﬀ patent. Since a
time period uniquely identiﬁes a market opening, in what follows t is used interchangeably
to denote a market opening or the time period associated with it. One could also think of
the dynamics arising from evolution of demand, revenues and costs for a particular generic
product as it diﬀuses through the market over time (see e.g. Ching (2010)). This would
lead to two time indices, one for the sequence of product markets opening over time and
the other for proﬁts over time within a product market. For computational feasibility, we
abstract from the latter and assume that once a ﬁrm enters a market it realizes all the payoﬀs
associated with that product market as a lump sum at the date of entry.
The actions available to ﬁrm i when market t opens are to enter, Ait = 1, or not enter
Ait = 0. Empirically this is determined by whether a ﬁrm submits an ANDA or not. There
are I ﬁrms in total so that the number of entrants in market t is given by
Nt =
I X
i=1
Ait (1)
The primary source of dynamics is through costs. The evolution of current costs, Cit, is
determined by past entry decisions and random shocks. The past entry decisions account for
spillovers of past industry experience on production costs in the current entry opportunity.
We will follow the standard convention that a lower case quantity denotes the logarithm of
an upper case quantity, e.g., cit = log(Cit). The log cost of a ﬁrm is assumed to follow a
stationary autoregressive process of order one. The equation governing the log cost of ﬁrm
i at market t is
cit = µc + ρc(ci,t−1 − µc) − κcAi,t−1 + σceit, (2)
where eit is a normally distributed shock with mean zero and unit variance, σc is a scale
parameter, κc is the entry spillover or immediate impact on cost at market t if there was
entry in market t − 1, µc is a location parameter that represents the overall average of the
10log cost over a long period of time. The autoregressive parameter ρc represents the degree
of persistence between the current cost and its long run stationary level. We assume that
all ﬁrms are ex ante identical, with the eﬀects of current decisions on future costs creating
heterogeneity between ﬁrms. Hence, none of these parameters are ﬁrm speciﬁc, i.e., indexed
by i. Alternatively put, heterogeneity arises endogenously in the model depending on the
past actions of the ﬁrms.
We assume, as in Scott-Morton (1999), that all ﬁrms observe each others’ costs and hence
this is a game of complete information. As far as the researcher is concerned the log cost
can be decomposed into a sum of two components, a known component (or observable to
the researcher based on past actions), ck,i,t, and a component unobservable to the researcher,
cu,i,t, as follows:
ci,t = cu,i,t + ck,i,t (3)
cu,i,t = µc + ρc (cu,i,t−1 − µc) + σceit (4)
ck,i,t = ρc ck,i,t−1 − κcAi,t−1 (5)
From these equations it is seen that the location parameter µc can be interpreted as the
stationary long run mean of the unobservable portion of log cost and that the total impact
of entry spillover at market t of a ﬁrm’s past entry decisions is ck,i,t = −
P∞
j=0 ρjκcAi,t−j−1.
Two implications of the speciﬁcation in equations (3)-(5) are that irrespective of the
calendar time that has elapsed between any two adjacent market openings, (i) cost decreases
are of the same magnitude, and (ii) the discount rate is held constant between market
openings. These are plausible assumptions for our application as in our estimation sample
(described earlier in Section 3) there are 40 openings in the period 1990-94, i.e. on average
a market opens every 1.5 months. This convention avoids insurmountable computational
diﬃculties in solving for the equilibrium of the model that would arise if unequal spacing
between market openings were assumed. Moreover, with this convention, we are only required
to obtain a correct chronological order of the data rather than to determine market entry
dates precisely. We order markets according to the date when the ﬁrst ANDA was received
by the FDA for a particular market opportunity.
Our timing convention underlying the dynamic cost process (equation (2)), i.e., each time
11period t represents the sequence of market openings and not calendar time, implies that the
cost advantage of entry dissipates with additional entry rather than the passage of calendar
time. This may happen due to capacity or resource constraints. As the resources required
for entry are stretched beyond their limits it may not be possible to expand the pool of
resources that can be devoted to additional projects easily. For example, a team that is
working on formulating a particular drug or guiding it through the FDA approval process
may only be able to work on a small number of projects at a given time and it may not be
easy to hire additional members for the team. Furthermore, in view of the excellent ﬁt to the
data that we are able to achieve (Section 8 below) this timing convention appears reasonable
a posteriori. Also of note is that although we are calling the latent variable “cost” for
convenience, it represents any unobserved variable that could have dynamic spillover eﬀects
of entry on proﬁts. For example, the underlying sources of the spillover could be supply side
factors like learning by doing or economies of scope or for that matter demand side factors
like reputation about quality or development of distribution networks. As stated earlier, the
spillover eﬀect estimated in this paper pertains to experience gained in producing drugs in
the form of oral solids. Quantifying other sources of spillovers is beyond the scope of this
paper as it would require expanding the state space leading to computational intractability.
The total (lump sum) revenue to be divided among ﬁrms who enter a market at time t
is Rt = exp(rt), which is realized from the following independent and identical distribution,
rt = µr + σreI+1,t , (6)
where eI+1,t is normally distributed with mean zero and unit variance. In equation (6), µr is
a location parameter that reﬂects the average total revenue for all the ﬁrms across all market
opportunities, and σr is a scale parameter. In our data the measure we have for total revenue
is from the last year the brand name drug was on patent. We interpret this value as being
exogenously determined solely by the ﬁrm manufacturing the branded product prior to the
entry decisions of the generic ﬁrms, and being proportional to the total discounted value of
the revenue ﬂows to generic drugs after patent expiration.
A total of ﬁfty one ﬁrms entered the market after the 1989 FDA bribery scandal. Com-
puting a solution to a dynamic game of strategic interactions between ﬁfty one players is not
12computationally feasible.7 Therefore, we consider only the dominant ﬁrms. In the following,
Nt is used to denote the number of entering dominant ﬁrms. We consider the case of three
and four dominant ﬁrms. Nt is less than or equal to I, which is the total number of domi-
nant ﬁrms (i.e. 3 or 4), which is considered to be time-invariant. Nt is to be diﬀerentiated
from Na
t , which is used to denote the total number of entrant ﬁrms at time t including both
dominant and nondominant ﬁrms.
We allow for nondominant ﬁrms as follows. Regressions indicate that logNa
t = blogRt,
with b ≈ 0.092, is a reasonable approximation to the total number of ﬁrms that enter
a market. The idea of this regression dates back to Bresnahan and Reiss (1991c) who
showed that there is a close relationship between the number of entrants and the total
market revenue. Therefore, when one of the dominant ﬁrms is considering entry, it can
anticipate that the revenue available to be divided among all dominant ﬁrms should be larger
than the average revenue available to each of the entering ﬁrms, which is logRanticipated ≥
logR−logNa = logR−blogR = log
￿
R1−b￿
. These considerations suggest that a reasonable
functional form for dominant ﬁrm i’s per period proﬁt at time t is
Ait (R
γ
t/Nt − Cit), (7)
with 1 − b = 0.908 being a reasonable lower bound for γ. The upper bound is one.
The ﬁrm’s total discounted proﬁt at time t is
∞ X
j=0
β
jAi,t+j
￿
R
γ
t+j/Nt+j − Ci,t+j
￿
, (8)
where β is the discount factor, 0 < β < 1. The ﬁrm’s objective is to maximize the present
discounted value of its proﬁt at each time period t taking as given the equilibrium action
proﬁles of other ﬁrms.
The Bellman equation for the choice speciﬁc value function, Vi(Ai,t,A−i,t,Ci,t,C−i,t,Rt),
7See Benkard, Weintraub, and Roy (2007) for a discussion of the concept of oblivious equilibrium and
the associated method to compute the solution to dynamic games when the number of players is very large.
13for ﬁrm i′s dynamic problem at time t is given by
Vi(Ai,t,A−i,t,Ci,t,C−i,t,Rt) (9)
= Ait (R
γ
t/Nt − Cit)
+ β E
h
Vi(A
E
i,t+1,A
E
−i,t+1,Ci,t+1,C−i,t+1,Rt+1)|Ai,t,A−i,t,Ci,t,C−i,t,Rt,
i
,
where by convention −i represents the other players. The choice speciﬁc value function
represents the sum of current and future payoﬀs to ﬁrm i from a choice Ai,t at time t explicitly
conditioning on the choices that would be made by other ﬁrms A−i,t at time t and with the
expectation that ﬁrm i and the other ﬁrms would be making equilibrium choices from period
t+1 onwards conditional on their current choices. The expectations operator here is over the
distribution of the state variables in time period t + 1 conditional on the realization of the
time t state variables and the action proﬁle at time t. Therefore Vi(Ai,t,A−i,t,Ci,t,C−i,t,Rt)
represents the payoﬀ of ﬁrm i at stage t of the game.
A stationary pure strategy Markov perfect equilibrium of the dynamic game is deﬁned
by a best response strategy proﬁle (AE
i,t, AE
−i,t) that satisﬁes
Vi(A
E
i,t,A
E
−i,t,Ci,t,C−i,t,Rt) ≥ Vi(Ai,t,A
E
−i,t,Ci,t,C−i,t,Rt) ∀ i,t, (10)
where AE
i,t is the entry decision of ﬁrm i for market t, AE
−i,t the vector of entry decisions of
the other dominant ﬁrms.
This is a game of complete information. Hence, if the state, which includes the current
cost of all ﬁrms (Ci,t,C−i,t) and total revenue (Rt), is known, then the equilibrium is known.
Therefore, an ex ante value function can be computed from the choice speciﬁc value function
Vi(Ci,t,C−i,t,Rt) = Vi(A
E
i,t,A
E
−i,t,Ci,t,C−i,t,Rt). (11)
The ex ante value function satisﬁes the Bellman equation
Vi(Cit,C−i,t,Rt) (12)
= A
E
it
￿
R
γ
t/N
E
t − Cit
￿
+ β E
h
Vi(Ci,t+1,C−i,t+1,Rt+1)|A
E
i,t,A
E
−i,t,Ci,t,C−i,t,Rt
i
,
where NE
t is the number of ﬁrms that enter, which can be computed using equation (1),
i.e., NE
t =
PI
i=1 AE
it. Equation (12) is diﬀerent from the Bellman equation associated with
14the choice speciﬁc value function (equation (9)) as it represents the sum of current and
future payoﬀs to ﬁrm i from an optimal choice AE
i,t at time t explicitly conditioning on
the equilibrium choices that would be made by other ﬁrms AE
−i,t at time t, and with the
expectation that all ﬁrms would be making equilibrium choices from period t+1 onwards. In
contrast to equation (9), the expectations operator here is over the conditional distribution
of the state variables in time period t + 1 with the value function evaluated at the best
response strategy proﬁle.
Reny (1999) demonstrated the complexity of the conditions required to guarantee exis-
tence of pure strategy equilibria in games in which payoﬀs are discontinuous in strategies,
as in our case. A comprehensive discussion of several results for existence of equilibria in
Markovian games is provided by Dutta and Sundaram (1998). More results on existence of
equilibria in dynamic oligopolistic models are to be found in Doraszelski and Satterthwaite
(2007). When the state space can only take on a ﬁnite set of values, Theorem 3.1 of Dutta
and Sundaram (1998) implies that this game has a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium
in mixed strategies. Parthasarathy (1973) showed that this baseline case can be relaxed
to include a state space with countable values. The regularity conditions of Theorem 5.1
of Dutta and Sundaram (1998) come closer to the problem as we have posed it, notably
that the revenue and cost do not have to be discrete but they do need to be bounded. The
equilibrium strategy proﬁles provided by Theorem 5.1 may depend on periods t and t−1 of
the state vector.
We could modify our problem to meet the requirements of Theorem 3.1 that the state
space be ﬁnite and countable. However we rely on Theorem 5.1 instead as we do not have
trouble computing pure strategy equilibria for the problem as posed with a continuous state
space. Theorem 3.1 is of interest to us because its proof relies on a dynamic programming
approach that motivates our computational strategy, discussed below in Section 6 (see also
Rust (1996) for a discussion of a similar computation strategy). We ﬁnd that we can always
compute pure strategy equilibria that depend only on period t of the state vector, and hence
automatically satisfy the regularity conditions of Theorem 5.1. While the results described
above imply that a slightly modiﬁed version of the game proposed by us has equilibria, we
rely mostly on the fact that we have no diﬃculty computing equilibria. In fact the key
15hurdle we face is not the lack of existence of equilibria but instead multiplicity of equilibria.
In Section 6 we discuss how we resolve this problem.
5 Solving the Model
Our estimation strategy is based on a nested approach wherein the solution of the dynamic
game is computed for each evaluation of a likelihood function that depends on both observ-
able and latent variables. To compute a likelihood that depends only on observable variables
in the data, the latent state variables are integrated out using sequential importance sam-
pling. Using the likelihood that depends only on observable data, an MCMC algorithm
generates draws from the posterior distribution of the parameters. The broad outline of
the computational strategy is as follows: (1) Generate a parameter value by means of an
MCMC algorithm. (2) For that parameter value, generate values for the latent variable over
the sample period by means of the importance sampler. (3) Solve the dynamic game to
compute the equilibrium outcome as function of the observed and unobserved state variables
and the parameter value. (4) Use the equilibrium outcome generated from the solution to
compute a likelihood that depends on the observed data and latent state variables (at the
given parameter value). (5) Integrate out the latent state variables by averaging the log
likelihood over repetitions of the importance sampler to obtain a log likelihood that depends
only observed variables (at the given parameter value).8 (6) Use the likelihood that depends
only on observed variables to make the accept/reject decision of the MCMC algorithm. Cy-
cling through steps (1) to (6) generates an MCMC chain that is a sample from the posterior
distribution of the parameters from which the posterior mean, mode, standard deviation,
etc. can be computed.
In this section we describe the method used to solve for the equilibrium of the dynamic
game given the observed and latent state variables and a set of parameter values. In Section 6
we describe how the likelihood is computed using the solution of the dynamic game and the
MCMC algorithm. Since we use an inﬁnite horizon model we look for a stationary Markov
perfect equilibrium which entails ﬁnding the ﬁxed point of the Bellman equation (12).
8As the name suggests, the sequential importance sampler does this by averaging sequentially as one
progresses through the sample rather than storing all latent variable trajectories prior to averaging them.
16Let the entry decisions of all i = 1,...,I ﬁrms for a market opening at time t, i.e., the
strategy proﬁle of the dynamic game, be denoted by
At = (A1t,...,AIt). (13)
As discussed in Section 4, the strategy proﬁle At at time t of the dynamic game is a function
of the current period state variables (C1t,...,CIt) and Rt. The vector of the log of the state
variables at time t is
st = (c1t,...,cIt,rt). (14)
In particular, equations (9) and (12) can be expressed in terms of st using Cit = exp(sit) for
i = 1,...,I and Rt = exp(sI+1,t). We describe the solution algorithm for a given parameter
vector and a given state st at time t.
We begin by deﬁning a grid on the state space which determines a set of (I + 1)-
dimensional hyper-cubes. For each hyper-cube we use its centroid as its index or key K.
A state st within hyper-cube can be mapped to its key K.9 Let the vector VK(st) have as
its elements the ex ante value functions Vi,K(st), i.e., VK(st) = (V1,K(st),...,VI,K(st)) (see
equations (11) and (12). To each K associate a vector bK of length I and a matrix BK of
dimension I by I + 1. A given state point st is mapped to its key K and the value function
at state st is represented by the aﬃne function VK(st) = bK + (BK)st.10 A value function
VK(st) whose elements satisfy equation (12) is denoted V ∗
K(st) = b∗
K + (B∗
K)st.
The game is solved as follows:
1. Given a state point s, get the key K that corresponds to it. (We suppress the subscript
t for notational convenience.)11
9Grid increments are chosen to be fractional powers of two so that the key has an exact machine repre-
sentation. This facilitates eﬃcient computation through compact storage of objects indexed by the key. The
rounding rules of the machine resolve which key a state on a grid boundary gets mapped to, although lying
on a boundary is a probability zero event in principle. The entire grid itself is never computed because all
we require is the mapping s  → K, which is determined by the increments. The end points of a hyper-cube
on the grid in order to ﬁnd the appropriate key K are computed as needed.
10Keane and Wolpin (1997) adopt a similar approach for a single agent model. Our approach diﬀers
from Keane and Wolpin (1997) in that we let the coeﬃcients of the regression depend on the state variables,
speciﬁcally the key K, whereas Keane and Wolpin (1997) use an OLS regression whose coeﬃcients are not
state speciﬁc. Thus, our value function, unlike theirs, need not be continuous. Our value function can be
thought of as an approximation by a local linear function.
11In fact, because it is a stationary game, the subscript t does not really matter
172. Check whether the ﬁxed point V ∗
K(s) of the Bellman equations (12) at this key has
already been computed, i.e., whether the (b∗
K,B∗
K) for the K that corresponds to s has
been computed. If not, then use the following steps to compute it.
3. Start with an initial guess of the ex ante value function V
(0)
K (s). An initial guess of the
value function is represented by the coeﬃcients (b
(0)
K ,B
(0)
K ) being set to 0.
4. Obtain a set of points sj, j = 1,...,J, that are centered around K. The objective
now is to obtain the ex ante value functions associated with these points to use in a
regression to recompute (or update) the the coeﬃcients (b
(0)
K ,B
(0)
K ).
5. Ex ante value functions are evaluated at best response strategies. In order to com-
pute these we must, for each sj, compute the choice speciﬁc value function (9) at as
many strategy proﬁles A as are required to determine whether or not the equilibrium
condition in equation (10) is satisﬁed. In this process we need to take expectations to
compute the continuation value β E
h
V
(0)
K,i(st+1)|Ai,t,A−i,t,Ci,t,C−i,t,Rt,
i
that appears
in equation (9), where we have used equation (11) to express equation (9) in terms
of V
(0)
K (s). To compute expectations over the conditional distribution of the random
components of next period state variables, we use Gauss-Hermite quadrature. To do
this, we obtain another set of points centered around each sj, i.e., sjl, l = 1,...,L.
These points are the abscissae of the Gauss-Hermite quadrature rule which are located
relative to sj but shifted by the actions A under consideration to account for the dy-
namic eﬀects of current actions on future costs (see equation (5)). Expectations are
computed using a weighted sum of the value function evaluated at the abscissae (more
details are provided below).
6. We can now compute the continuation value at sj for each candidate strategy A. We
compute the best response strategy proﬁle AE
j corresponding to sj by checking the
Nash equilibrium condition (equation 10). As just described, the choice speciﬁc value
function evaluated at (AE
i , sj) is computed using V
(0)
K (s) and equation (9), and denoted
by V
(1)
K (AE,sj) = (V
(1)
1,K(AE,sj),...,V
(1)
I,K(AE,sj)).
187. Next we use the “data” (V
(1)
K (AE,sj),sj)J
j=1 to update the ex ante value function
to V
(1)
K (sj). This is done by updating the coeﬃcients of its aﬃne representation to
(b
(1)
K ,B
(1)
K ) via a multivariate regression on this “data” (as described in detail below).12
8. We iterate (go back to step 5) over the ex ante value functions V
(0)
i,K(s),V
(1)
i,K(s),... by
ﬁnding a new equilibrium strategy proﬁle AE for each sj until convergence is achieved
for the coeﬃcients (b
(0)
K ,B
(0)
K ), (b
(1)
K ,B
(1)
K ),...,(b
(∗)
K ,B
(∗)
K ). This gives us V ∗
K(s) = b∗
K +
(B∗
K)s for every s that maps to key K.
To summarize, the process of solving for the equilibrium begins with a conjecture (b
(l)
K =
0,B
(l)
K = 0) for the linear approximation of the value functions at a given state at iteration
l = 0. These guesses are then used in computing the choice speciﬁc value functions at
iteration l + 1 using equation (9). This computation involves taking expectations over the
conditional distribution of the future state variables, which is accomplished using Gaussian-
Hermite quadrature. Once we have the choice speciﬁc value functions we compute the
equilibrium strategy proﬁle at iteration l+1 using equation (10). The best response strategy
proﬁle at iteration l + 1 is then used to compute the iteration l + 1 ex ante value functions
via a regression that can be viewed as iterating equation (12). The iteration l + 1 ex ante
value functions are then used to compute the iteration l + 2 choice speciﬁc value functions
using equation (9), and the entire procedure is repeated till a ﬁxed point of equation (12)
is obtained. This iterative procedure solves the dynamic game. We next provide additional
details about the steps of the algorithm described above to solve the model.
To describe the Gauss-Hermite quadrature procedure used in Step 5, note that if one
conditions upon st and At, then the elements of st+1 are independently normally distributed
with means µi = µc+ρc(cit−µc)−κcAit for the ﬁrst I elements (see equation 2), mean µI+1 =
µR for the last element (see equation 6), standard deviations σi = σc for the ﬁrst I elements,
and standard deviation σI+1 = σR for the last. Computing a conditional expectation of
functions of the form f(st+1) given (At, st) such as appear in equations (9) and (12) is
now a matter of integrating with respect to a normal distribution with these means and
variances which can be done by a Gauss-Hermite quadrature rule that has been subjected
12V
(1)
K (AE,sj) will not equal V
(1)
K (sj) because the former is “data” and the later is a regression prediction.
19to location and scale transformations. The weights wj and abscissae xj for Gauss-Hermite
quadrature may be obtained from tables such as Abramowitz and Stegun (1964) or by direct
computation using algorithms such as Golub and Welsch (1969) as updated in Golub (1973).
To integrate with respect to sj,t+1 conditional upon At and st the abscissae are transformed
to ˜ st+1,j = µj+
√
2σjxj, and the weights are transformed to ˜ wj = wj/
√
π, where π = 3.142.13
Then, using a 2L + 1 rule,
E[f(st+1)|At,st] ≈
L X
j1=−L
   
L X
jI=−L
L X
jI+1=−L
f(˜ st+1,j1,    , ˜ st+1,jI, ˜ st+1,jI+1) ˜ wj1    ˜ wjI ˜ wjI+1. (15)
If, for example, there are three ﬁrms and a three point quadrature rule is used, then
E[f(st+1)|At,st] ≈
1 X
i=−1
1 X
j=−1
1 X
k=−1
1 X
l=−1
f(˜ si, ˜ sj, ˜ sk, ˜ sl) ˜ wi ˜ wj ˜ wk ˜ wl.
We use three point rules throughout. A three point rule will integrate a polynomial in st+1
up to degree ﬁve exactly.14
Step 7 involves updating the ex ante value function using a regression. We next describe
how we do this. As stated above, we have a grid over the state space whose boundaries are
fractional powers of two over the state space.15 We approximate the value function V (st)
by a locally indexed aﬃne representation as described above. For the the grid increments
that determine the index of hyper-cubes we tried a range of values from 4 to 16 times the
standard deviation of the state variables rounded to a nearby fractional power of two to
scale the grid appropriately. The results are eﬀectively the same. Hence in estimating the
model we set the grid increments at 16 times the standard deviation of the state variables.16
13These transformations arise because a Hermite rule integrates
R ∞
−∞ f(x)exp(−x2)dx. Hence we need
to do a change of variables to get our integral
R ∞
−∞ g(σz + µ)(1/
√
2π)exp(−0.5z2)dz to be of that form. A
change of variables puts the equation in the line above in the form
R ∞
−∞ g(
√
2σx + µ)(1/
√
π)exp(−x2)dx,
which is where the expressions for ˜ st+1,i and ˜ wi come from.
14If the ˜ st+1 cross a grid boundary when computing (9) in Step 5, we do not recompute K because this
would create an impossible circularity due to the fact that the value function at the new K may not yet be
available. Our grid increments are large relative to the scatter of abscissae of the quadrature rule so that
crossing a boundary will be a rare event, if it happens at all.
15Recall that grid increments are chosen to be fractional powers of two so that the key has an exact
machine representation. This facilitates eﬃcient computation through compact storage of objects indexed
by the key.
16The set of keys that actually get visited in any MCMC repetition is about the same for grid increments
ranging from 4 to 16 times the standard deviation of the state variables in our data. For a three ﬁrm game
the number of hyper-cubes that actually are visited in any one repetition is about six.
20We compute the coeﬃcients bK and BK as follows. They are ﬁrst initialized to zero. We
then generate a set of abscissae {sj} clustered about K and solve the game with payoﬀs (9)
to get corresponding equilibria {AE
j }. We substitute the (AE
j ,sj) pairs into equation (9) to
get {V (AE
j ,sj)}J
j=1. Using the pairs {(V (AE
j ,sj),sj} as data, we compute bK and BK by
multivariate least squares. We repeat until the bK and BK stabilize. We have found that
approximately twenty iterations suﬃce for three ﬁrms and thirty for four ﬁrms.17 The easiest
way to get a cluster of points {sj} about a key is to use abscissae from the quadrature rule
described above with s set to K and A set to zero. However, one must jiggle the points so
that no two ﬁrms have exactly the same cost (see next paragraph for the reason for this).
Of importance in reducing computational eﬀort is to avoid recomputing the payoﬀ (equation
(9)) when checking equilibrium condition (10). Our strategy is to (temporarily) store payoﬀ
vectors indexed by A and check for previously computed payoﬀs before computing new ones
in checking condition (10).
There will, at times, be multiple equilibria in solving the game. We therefore adopt an
equilibrium selection rule as follows. Multiple equilibria usually take the form of a situation
where one or another ﬁrm can proﬁtably enter but if both enter they both will incur losses
whereas if neither enters then one of them would have an incentive to deviate. In the three
ﬁrm game the frequency of multiple equilibria is about 4%. We resolve this situation by
assuming an explicit equilibrium selection rule. We pick the equilibrium with the lowest
total cost. This idea is similar to that used by Berry (1992) and Scott-Morton (1999). That
is, the strategy proﬁles At are ordered by increasing aggregate cost, C =
PI
i=1 AitCit and
the ﬁrst At that satisﬁes the equilibrium condition (10) is accepted as the solution. Note
that our distributional assumptions on st guarantee that no two C can be equal so that this
ordering of the At is unique. Moreover, none of the Cit can equal one another; and when
that is true we have never failed to be able to compute a pure strategy equilibrium for each
parameter value as soon as we compute a suﬃcient number of value function iterations.
In general, because we use importance sampling and Bayesian MCMC methods, as long
17An alternative is to apply a modiﬁed Howard acceleration strategy as described in Kuhn (2006); see also
Rust (1996) and Howard (1960). The idea is simple: The solution {AE
t } of the game with payoﬀs (9) will
not change much, if at all, for small changes in the value function V (s). Therefore, rather than recompute
the solution at every step of the (bK,Bk) iterations, one can reuse a solution for a few steps.
21as one is willing to assume that the data is generated from a pure strategy equilibrium at the
true parameter value, a parameter and state trajectory pair that has no equilibrium can be
regarded as an irrelevant portion of the parameter space and rejected at the MCMC likeli-
hood comparison step. That is, given parameters, only particles that produce equilibria are
retained. A state trajectory that does not produce an equilibrium could not have occurred.
6 Likelihood Computation
Denote the part of the state vector that is unobservable to us by
Xt = (Cu,1,t,...,Cu,I,t). (16)
Denote the variables that we can observe by
Yt = (A
o
1t,...,A
o
It,Ck,1,t,...,Ck,I,t,Rt). (17)
As previously, a lower case variable denotes the logarithm of an upper case variable
with the exception that at = At. With these conventions, xt = (cu,1,t,...,cu,I,t), and
yt = (a1t,...,aIt,ck,1,t,...,ck,I,t,rt). Recall that cost evolves as
ci,t = cu,i,t + ck,i,t (18)
cu,i,t = µc + ρc (cu,i,t−1 − µc) + σceit (19)
ck,i,t = ρc ck,i,t−1 − κcA
o
i,t−1 (20)
and revenue evolves as
rt = µr + σreI+1,t. (21)
We have data for both the pre- and post-scandal periods. The pre-scandal period is
indexed by t = −n0,...,0 and the values of Yt over the pre-scandal period are denoted by
Ypre. The post-scandal period is indexed by t = 1,...,n with values over it denoted by Ypost.
While the scandal changed the market structure thus rendering the pre-scandal data
unsuitable for general estimation, it can still be used for two purposes: The pre-scandal
entries {Ao
it}0
t=−n0 can be used to compute the last two pre-scandal values ck,i,−1 and ck,i,0 of
the observable part of log cost for each ﬁrm; The scandal log revenues {rt}0
t=−n0 can be used
to help identify the parameters µr and σr.
22We compute the last two pre-scandal values ck,i,−1 and ck,i,0 for each ﬁrm by running the
recursion (20) started at −n0 over the observed choices {Ao
it}0
t=−n0. This gives us the vectors
y−1 and y0 because (R−1, Ao
−1) and (R0, Ao
0) are also in Ypre.
How to use the pre-scandal log revenue to help identify the parameters µr and σr is
discussed in Subsection 6.3.
6.1 Boundedly Rational Likelihood
Because we are estimating a game of pure strategy, a density for the strategy proﬁle At that
depends only on (xt,rt,yt−1) and the model parameters introduced thus far18 would put mass
one on a single value of At. The implication is that a likelihood that depends only on these
parameters and {(xt,rt,yt−1)}n
t=1 would be one if we predict every entry decision perfectly
and zero otherwise. Estimation with such a likelihood would not be practicable.
We resolve this problem by deﬁning a misclassiﬁcation probability qa = 1−pa, 0 < pa < 1,
and adopting19 the following likelihood for an observed (ex post) action proﬁle Ao
t
p(A
o
t |rt,xt,yt−1,θ) =
I Y
i=1
(pa)
I(Ao
it=Ait)(1 − pa)
I(Ao
it =Ait) (22)
where Ait is the predicted entry decision computed from the model given (xt,rt,yt−1) and
θ = (µc,ρc,σc,κc,µr,σr,γ,β,pa) (23)
using the methods described in Section 5. The full likelihood for the data is, of course, the
product
Qn
t=1 p(Ao
t |rt,xt,yt−1,θ).
There are several ways that one can justify this likelihood of which the most appealing
is that there is a small probability qa that planned entry decisions are not realized. This
could come about, e.g., because a decision to enter is thwarted by disapproval of an ANDA
application or because a decision not to enter is eﬀectively reversed by an acquisition. Less
appealing interpretations are that (22) represents measurement error either on the part of
the econometrician or the ﬁrm due to, e.g., clerical error or ﬁrms not being able to observe
competitors’ entry decisions before a decision must be made on the next drug coming oﬀ
18µc,ρc,σc,κc,µr,σr,γ,β
19Our approach is similar to that frequently adopted in likelihood based inference when estimating reser-
vation wages in labor search models, and in estimating models of option pricing and yield curves.
23patent. The various interpretations have diﬀerent likelihood implications. We shall adopt
the ﬁrst interpretation that there is a small probability that plans are not realized.
A ﬁrm can either take the probability qa that plans will not be realized into account
or not in making its entry decision. Because ignoring qa dramatically reduces the cost of
computing a decision and because, as seen later, ignoring qa for small pa has little eﬀect on
decisions, solving the game with qa ignored can be viewed as a boundedly rational solution
strategy. Conversely, taking qa into account can be viewed as a fully rational strategy.
The boundedly rational likelihood is easy to describe: It is (22) with At computed as
described in Section 5. When it is necessary to distinguish a boundely rational equilibrium,
we use the notation ABR
t .
6.2 Fully Rational Likelihood
In a fully rational solution, ﬁrms account for the potential discrepancy between future equi-
librium and ex post action proﬁles in forming continuation values. This requires redeﬁnition
of the choice speciﬁc value function (9) as follows:
V
f
i (Ai,t,A−i,t,Ci,t,C−i,t,Rt)
=
1 X
l1=0
p
l1=A1t
a q
l1 =A1t
a    
1 X
lI=0
p
lI=AIt
a q
lI =AIt
a
￿
li
 
R
γ
t PI
j=1 lj
− Cit
!
(9′)
+ β E
h
V
f
i (A
E
i,t+1,A
E
−i,t+1,Ci,t+1,C−i,t+1,Rt+1)|Li,t,L−i,t,Ci,t,C−i,t,Rt
i￿
,
where Li,t = li and L−i,t is (l1,...,lI) with li deleted. Note that Li,t and L−i,t aﬀect the
conditioning information via equations (18) through (20). Speciﬁcally,
cj,t+1 = cu,j,t+1 + ck,j,t+1
cu,j,t+1 = µc + ρc (cu,j,t − µc) + σcej,t+1
ck,j,t+1 = ρc ck,j,t − κclj
both for j ∈ Li,t and j ∈ L−i,t; lj, like Aj, is one for entry and zero otherwise..
A fully rational stationary pure strategy equilibrium is deﬁned by a best response strategy
proﬁle (AE
i,t,AE
−i,t) that satisﬁes (10) with V f replacing V . When it is necessary to distinguish
a fully rational equilibrium, we use the notation AFR
t .
24The ex ante value function is related to the choice speciﬁc value function by (11) with V f
replacing V and AFR
t replacing AE. The expression that replaces (12) is more complicated
and cannot be described by simple plug-in rules as with the replacements for (10) and (11).
However, we have no need for an explicit expression because the ex ante Bellman equation
is deﬁned operationally by the algorithm described in Section 5. That algorithm makes no
explicit use of (12). It only uses the choice speciﬁc value function deﬁned by (9) and the fact
that the left hand sides of (9) and (12) are the same at an equilibrium due to (11). All that
is required to compute the fully rational equilibrium is to modify Step 5 of that algorithm
by replacing (9) by (9′), Ai,t by Li,t, and A−i,t by L−i,t.
The fully rational likelihood is (22) with At = AFR
t .
The algorithm for parameter estimation described Section 7 applies to both the boundedly
rational likelihood and the fully rational likelihood. The results from implementing both for
the data displayed in Table 1 are discussed in Section 8.
6.3 Pre-Scandal Information
While the scandal may have aﬀected which ﬁrms participated in the market post-scandal,
there is no reason to believe that market opportunities were diﬀerent pre- and post-scandal.
Therefore the pre-scandal data can be used to help identify the revenue distribution. From
Ypre we can compute a normal likelihood for log revenue over the period −n0,...,0. Although
this likelihood actually only depends on two elements (µr,σr) of θ, we denote it as p(Ypre |θ)
for convenience.
7 Parameter Estimation
Douced, de Freitas, and Gordon (2001) present a concise description of the sequential impor-
tance sampler that we follow in describing our analysis. The densities relevant to a sequential
importance sampler are the transition density of the hidden state vector
p(xt |xt−1,θ), (24)
which is deﬁned by recursion equation (19), the initial density
p(x0 |θ), (25)
25which, from equation (19), is normal with mean µc and standard deviation σc/
p
1 − ρ2
c, and
the observation density
p(yt |yt−1,xt,θ) = p(A
o
t |rt,yt−1,xt,θ)p(rt |yt−1,xt,θ), (26)
where, from equation (21), p(rt |yt−1,xt,θ) is normal with mean µr and standard deviation
σr.
The sequential importance sampler is as follows:
1. For t = 0
(a) Start N particles by drawing x
(j)
0 for j = 1,...,N from the initial density equa-
tion (25).
(b) Compute
p(y0 |θ) =
Z
p(y0 |y−1,x0,θ)p(y−1,x0 |θ)dx0
. =
1
N
N X
j=1
p(y0 |y−1,x
(j)
0 ,θ).
2. For t = 1,...,n
(a) For each particle, draw ˜ x
(j)
t from the transition density equation (24) and set
˜ x
(j)
0:t = (x
(j)
0:t−1, ˜ x
(j)
t ).
(b) For each particle compute the particle weights ˆ w
(j)
t using the observation density
equation (26); i.e.
˜ w
(j)
t = p(yt |yt−1, ˜ x
(j)
t ,θ).
The parametrization in equation (22) eliminates the problem that the weights
could all be zero.
(c) Normalize the weights so that they sum to one
ˆ w
(j)
t =
˜ w
(j)
t
PN
j=1 ˜ w
(j)
t
.
26(d) For j = 1,...,N sample with replacement the particles x
(j)
0:t from the set {˜ x
(j)
0:t}
according to the weights { ˆ w
(j)
t }. (Note the convention: Particles with unequal
weights are denoted by {˜ x
(j)
0:t}. After resampling the particles are denoted by
{x
(j)
0:t}.)
(e) Compute
p(yt |y1:t−1,θ,pa) =
Z
p(yt |yt−1,xt,θ)p(yt−1,xt |y1:t−1,θ)dxt
. =
1
N
N X
j=1
p(yt |yt−1,x
(j)
t ,θ).
Note that p(yt |yt−1,x
(j)
t ,θ) does not have to be recomputed here if the weights
˜ w
(j)
t are associated to x
(j)
t in the resampling step and saved. If each ﬁrm’s entry
decisions are similarly associated, then classiﬁcation error rates can be computed
at this step.
3. The likelihood is
L(θ) = p(y0:t |θ) = p(Ypre |θ,pa)p(y0 |θ)
n Y
t=1
p(yt |y0:t−1,θ).
Figure 1 about here
Figure 2 about here
Figure 3 about here
Figure 4 about here
The log likelihood surface is plotted on a ﬁne grid in Figure 1 and on a coarse grid in
Figure 2 for the three ﬁrm model. Figures 3 and 4 are for the four ﬁrm model. The endpoints
of the horizontal axes are tenth of a standard deviation to the left and right of the maximum
in Figure 1 and 24 standard deviations to the right and left in Figure 2. For Figures 3
27and 4 they are a tenth and 48. These are proﬁle likelihoods; i.e., in each panel the indicated
parameter is moved and all others are ﬁxed at the values that maximize the likelihood.
As seen from Figures 1 and 3, the surface is, basically, a step function so that curvature
at the maximum will not provide a reliable basis for inference. The reason, of course, is
that small changes in the parameters do not cause the decisions of the ﬁrms to change. In
this situation, accurate frequentist inference would be diﬃcult and would be prohibitively
computationally intensive if bootstrapping were involved. On the other hand, Bayesian
inference in this situation is conceptually straightforward and computationally feasible.
However, Figures 2 and 4 do suggest that implementing a Bayesian strategy that explores
the surface well will be a challenge. They also suggest that the standard deviations of the
posterior will be extremely tight. The horizontal line is at three orders of magnitude below
the maximum. If an MCMC chain is near the maximum, the chance that it will move to a
point below the horizontal line line is less than 0.001.
An MCMC chain that uses a move-one-at-a-time random walk proposal density will
usually do a good job of exploring surfaces such as seen in Figures 2 and 4; see Gamerman
and Lopes (2006). However this comes at a cost because an MCMC chain that uses a move-
one-at-a-time random walk proposal strategy is usually ineﬃcient relative to those that use
other proposal strategies. Brieﬂy, the method is as follows: The proposal density q(θo,θ∗)
deﬁnes a distribution of potential new values θ∗ given an old value θo. Denote the likelihood
by L(θ) and the prior by π(θ). Given the value θo at the end of the MCMC chain, one moves
the chain forward one step to θ′ as follows:
1. Draw θ∗ according to q(θo,θ∗).
2. Let α = min
￿
1,
L(θ∗)π(θ∗)q(θ∗,θo)
L(θo)π(θo)q(θo,θ∗)
￿
.
3. With probability α, set θ ′ = θ∗, otherwise set θ′ = θo.
For our particular q, one randomly chooses an element j of θo to move and then proposes
a new value by replacing θo
j with a draw from the normal distribution with mean θo
j and
scale σj, where σj is chosen such that acceptance at Step (3) occurs with a frequency of
about 30% (see e.g., Gelman, Roberts, and Gilks (1996), Roberts and Rosenthal (2001)).
28The vertical lines in Figures 2 and 4 indicate the range of the MCMC chain’s excursions
after the transient elements of the chain have died out.
The likelihood is hierarchical in that given model parameters and conditional upon the
latent cost variables, it can be evaluated by solving the game. Given this structure, estima-
tion can be viewed as a double-layer nesting of the conditional likelihood within an outer
MCMC loop and an inner importance sampling loop. The MCMC proposal density ﬁxes θ
in the outer loop. The sequential importance sampler generates a cost trajectory within the
inner loop. Solving the game both evaluates the conditional likelihood along this trajectory
and provides the importance sampler with the information needed to adjust costs sequen-
tially along the trajectory to take into account the eﬀect of entry decisions on the trajectory.
When one falls through the inner loop, the likelihood has been averaged over costs thereby
averaging out the latent cost distribution. At this point the MCMC accept/reject decision
is made and the MCMC chain is moved forward. One iterates through the outer loop to
obtain the complete MCMC chain.
We implement our computational algorithm using code that is in the public domain
and available at http://econ.duke.edu/webfiles/arg/emm. This code is based on Cher-
nozhukov and Hong (2003). Full details regarding the proposal density and other conventions
are in the User’s Guide distributed with the code. One needs enough draws to accurately
compute averages such as standard deviations, histograms, and other characteristics of the
posterior distribution. Our chains are highly correlated so that very long chains with a
stride (sampling rate) of 375 are required to break the dependence. As explained in the
User’s Guide, computations can be accelerated if the values of θ visited by the chain are
restricted to (fractional) powers of two. We impose this restriction on the chain.
The parameter pa can either be estimated or be ﬁxed at various values. We tried values
from 0.75 to 0.95. We ﬁnd that estimates of the other elements of θ are hardly aﬀected.
What we do ﬁnd is that varying pa aﬀects the rate at which particles die out at Step (2d)
in the sequential importance sampler. Since we are not using the sequential importance
sampler as a smoother, the rate at which particles die out is of no concern. We always
have a large number of points available at Step (2e) of the sequential importance sampler;
we experimented with diﬀerent number of particles till the results were not sensitive to
29the choice of number of particles. When pa is treated as a parameter to be estimated,
the performance of the MCMC algorithm is degraded somewhat. We think that ﬁxing pa
is preferred because doing so improves performance and permits a cleaner comparison of
results across the cases I = 3,4 that we consider in Section 8.
The ﬁrm’s discount rate β is extremely diﬃcult to estimate in studies of this sort (see
e.g., Magnac and Thesmar (2002) and Rust (1994)) and we ﬁnd this to be the case here.20 A
common rule of thumb in business is not to undertake a project whose internal rate of return
is less than 20%. Grabowski, Vernon, and DiMasi (2002) state that estimates of internal rates
speciﬁc to the drug industry range “from 13.5% to over 20%.” Theoretically, a ﬁrm should
not undertake a project whose rate of return is less than its cost of capital. The historical risk
premium in the drug industry is 12.55%, (e.g., Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001)).
Adding to this a nominal borrowing rate of 5% one arrives at the value 17.55%. Grabowski,
Vernon, and DiMasi (2002) arrive at a nominal cost of capital of 14% using a CAPM method
that they regard as biased downward. On the basis of these considerations we set the ﬁrm’s
discount rate at 20%. There are 40 market entry opportunities in our ﬁve years of data. That
implies an expected time increment of 0.125 years between prospective projects for the ﬁrms
in our data. Therefore, using an annual internal rate of 20%, allowing for compounding, and
rounding to a nearby fractional power of two, we set β = 0.96875.
Examination of equation (9) indicates that were γ to enter as a linear factor then γ would
not be identiﬁed. That in fact it enters to the ﬁrst order as (1+γ logR) does not help matters
much. Attempts to estimate γ anyway yield estimates that meander about 0.93. Therefore,
based on the plausible lower bound of 0.908 derived in Section 4 and our experience from
trying to estimate γ, we take 0.93 to be a reasonable value. Rounding to a nearby fractional
power of two, we set γ = 0.9375.
For the remaining parameters we use ﬂat, noninformative priors that impose these sup-
port conditions: −1 ≤ ρc ≤ 1, 0 ≤ κc, 0 < σc, and 0 < σr.21
20See Kasahara and Shimotsu (2008) and Hu and Shum (2008) for more results on nonparameteric iden-
tiﬁcation of single agent dynamic discrete choice models.
21Open ended ranges actually should have large upper and lower bounds to assure stationarity of the
MCMC chain. As seen from our histograms, Figures 5 and 6, bounds do not interfere with the chain.
308 Results
We estimate both the boundedly rational and fully rational models for two cases: (1) the
top three dominant ﬁrms are the only potential entrants that are strategic competitors (the
actions of the remaining 48 ﬁrms are accounted for by the parameter γ), and (2) the top
four dominant ﬁrms are only potential entrants (the actions of the other 47 entrants are
accounted for by γ). The mode and standard deviations of the posterior distribution are
reported in Table 2 for the boundedly rational model and in Table 3 for the fully rational
model. We focus on the mode of the multivariate posterior distribution because it actually
corresponds to a value at which the model has been evaluated. Other measures of central
tendency of the posterior distribution can be misleading when studying the behavior of a
structural model because they may have never appeared in the MCMC chain and could give
a distorted view of the model were it to be evaluated at such a point.
Table 2 about here
Table 3 about here
As evident from these two tables, the parameter estimates are very similar across the
boundedly rational and the fully rational models. Therefore in the rest of paper we will dis-
cuss the results using the boundedly rational model. The parameters are tightly estimated22
and, as seen from the extremely low classiﬁcation error rates, model predictions are quite
accurate. The large value of ρc implies costs are persistent. A value of κc of 0.07 implies
that an immediate cost reduction of 7% going into the next market opening, and the average
annual cumulative reduction computed using the AR(1) cost process (equation (2)) is 51%.
However, σc is large, so that this reduction can easily be eliminated by a cost shock.23
Histograms of the marginal posterior distributions are displayed in Figures 5 and 6 for
the three and four ﬁrm cases, respectively.
22Despite the small standard deviations shown in Table 2, the proﬁle likelihoods in Figures 2 and 4
suggest that the MCMC chain adequately explored the posterior density. The likelihood is proportional to
the posterior because priors are ﬂat.
23One source of this large standard deviation may be organizational forgetting (see e.g., Benkard (2000),
Besanko, Kryukov, Doraszelski, and Satterthwaite (2007)). However, since we do not explicitly model
forgetting in the AR(1) cost process we are cautious in making this interpretation.
31Figure 5 about here
Figure 6 about here
Figure 7 about here
Figure 8 about here
Figure 9 about here
Figure 7 plots the log cost of the three dominant ﬁrms in the three ﬁrm model in the upper
three panels. The circles indicate that the ﬁrm entered that market. The logarithm of cost
is computed by averaging at Step (2e) of the importance sampler. The bottom panel shows
log total revenue; the numbers at the bottom of this panel are the number of dominant ﬁrms
who entered the market at that time point. The top ﬁrm, Mylan, has a clear cost advantage
over its competitors. Broad trends in cost are about the same for all ﬁrms.
Figure 8 plots together the log cost of the three dominant ﬁrms from both the 3 and 4
ﬁrm models. The circles at the bottom of the upper panel indicate which markets Mylan
entered, the crosses in the middle panel are the same for Novopharm, and the asterisks in
the lower panel are the same for Lemmon. The construction of the plots is the same as
for Figure 7. The salient feature of this plot is that costs for the three dominant ﬁrms are
estimated as being about the same in the three and four ﬁrm models.
Figure 9 displays the entry decisions of the dominant ﬁrms, period by period, as circles
and the model’s average prediction of their entry, period by period, as crosses. The average
prediction is computed by averaging game solutions at Step (2e) of the importance sampler
at the mode of the posterior density. The classiﬁcation error rates shown in Table 2 can be
viewed as the errors that would obtain if decisions were predicted by using a threshold of
0.5 to predict entry (i.e., entry if predicted probability ≥ 0.5; no entry otherwise) for the
average predictions shown in Figure 9.
Another way is to assess results is to directly explore the possibility that the ﬁrms play
a diﬀerent game than the game we propose rather than inferring the importance of the
32dynamics from the estimate of κc. Consider two other games analogous to the previous
partial solution model that might be played instead of the game with payoﬀs (9). They
could play a game with payoﬀs
Vi(Ai,t,A−i,t,Ci,t,C−i,t,Rt) = Ait (R
γ
t/Nt − Cu,i,t), (27)
where no attention at all is paid to the cost reductions arising from past market entries (κc =
0) or to dynamic spillovers of entry (β = 0). We call this the myopic game (β = 0,κc = 0).
Or they could play a game with payoﬀs
Vi(Ai,t,A−i,t,Ci,t,C−i,t,Rt) = Ait (R
γ
t/Nt − Cit) (28)
where they take cognizance of the eﬀect of entry on costs but ignore the continuation value
of the game, i.e., β = 0. We call this the static game (β = 0,κc > 0).
For the three ﬁrm game the myopic game (β = 0,κc = 0) has an equilibrium that agrees
with the solution of the game we propose (i.e., the game with payoﬀs (9)) in 49% of the cases.
The game that ignores the continuation value (β = 0,κc > 0) has an equilibrium that agrees
in 81% of the cases. For the four ﬁrm game, these values are 31% and 68%, respectively.
These values were computed by using the posterior modes shown for the game in Table 2
and ﬁnding all equilibria for the three games for all costs that obtained at Step (2b) of the
sequential importance sampler. Incidentally, we can also compute the incidence of multiple
equilibria for these three games. For the three ﬁrm game they are 5% (β = 0, κc = 0), 5%
(β = 0, κc > 0), and 4% (β > 0, κc > 0), respectively. For the four ﬁrm game they are 5%,
7%, and 4%, respectively. As discussed earlier, we adopt an explicit equilibrium selection
rule, i.e., we pick the equilibrium with the lowest total cost.
These computations suggest that the myopic and static games would do a poor job of
rationalizing the data. To check, we use our parameter estimates, impose β = κc = 0, and
ﬁnd that the overall classiﬁcation error rate for the myopic game exceeds the overall value
in Table 2 by a factor of 3.8 for the three player game and 3.6 for the four player game.
Similarly, imposing β = 0, we ﬁnd that the classiﬁcation error rate for the static game
exceeds the values in Table 2 by a factor of 2.0 for both the three and four player games.
It is worth asking the question whether what is recovered is the dynamic spillover eﬀect
of entry, i.e., entry reduces costs or whether the causality is reversed and it is low cost
33ﬁrms that enter. In the latter case one could think of a situation where there is persistent
heterogeneity in costs across ﬁrms and the low cost ﬁrms always enter and the high cost
ﬁrms stay out. Recall that in our model all ﬁrms are the same ex ante. Heterogeneity in
costs arises endogenously based in part on past actions. Therefore Figures 7, 8, and 9 are to
be viewed as ex-post reconstructions of the history of the game. However, one might surmise
from the volatility of the plots that too much emphasis is being placed on the trajectory of
equation (4) (i.e., the “unknown” component of costs) and not enough on (5) (i.e., “known”
component of costs). Stated diﬀerently, one might surmise that the eﬀect of the random
shocks (operating through σc) is too large and of the dynamic spillovers (through κc) is too
small or that more generally σc and κc are correlated. One way to check this is to set σc to
smaller values and re-run the MCMC chain. Setting σc to 0.25, 0.125, and 0.0625 has very
little eﬀect on κc although it does dramatically reduce the likelihood evaluated at the mode.
Thus we conclude that we are estimating the eﬀect of entry on costs and not vice versa.
9 Conclusions
In this paper we provide evidence on the dynamic spillover eﬀects of past industry experience
in one product market on performance in other product markets for the generic pharmaceu-
tical industry. Our stylized model ﬁts the data well, i.e., the classiﬁcation error rates are
small. Our results also enhance understanding of entry decisions in the pharmaceutical in-
dustry. We ﬁnd evidence that past entry aﬀects current costs and that the dynamic evolution
of the production cost plays an important role in the equilibrium path of the generic phar-
maceutical industry structure. In order to do estimate our model we develop a procedure
based on sequential importance sampling to estimate a dynamic discrete game that includes
serially correlated unobserved endogenous state variables. Our method is more generally
applicable to estimating dynamic games in which heterogeneity between agents arises from
serially correlated unobserved endogenous state variables. Our method is feasible whenever
there is available an algorithm for solving the game and a Markovian representation of the
latent dynamics.
The spillover eﬀect estimated in this paper is related to experience gained in producing
drugs in the form of oral solids. It may be worthwhile in future work to quantify other sources
34of spillovers. This beyond the scope of this paper due to the prohibitive computational
burden it would impose by expanding the state space. Another important extension would be
to allow for estimation of dynamic games where the strategy set is mixed discrete-continuous,
e.g., introduction of a new brand and the associated decision about advertising expenditure.
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42Table 1. Data
Dominant Firms
(enter = 1, not enter = 0)
Drug / Active Ingredient ANDA Date Mylan Novopharm Lemmon Geneva Total Revenue
Entrants ($’000s)
Sulindac 03 Apr. 90 1 0 1 1 7 189010
Erythromycin Stearate 15 May 90 0 0 0 0 1 13997
Atenolol 31 May 90 1 0 0 0 4 69802
Nifedipine 04 Jul. 90 0 1 0 0 5 302983
Minocycline Hydrochloride 14 Aug. 90 0 0 0 0 3 55491
Methotrexate Sodium 15 Oct. 90 1 0 0 0 3 24848
Pyridostigmine Bromide 27 Nov. 90 0 0 0 0 1 2113
Estropipate 27 Feb. 91 0 0 0 0 2 6820
Loperamide Hydrochloride 30 Aug. 91 1 1 1 1 5 31713
Phendimetrazine 30 Oct. 91 0 0 0 0 1 1269
Tolmetin Sodium 27 Nov. 91 1 1 1 1 7 59108
Clemastine Fumarate 31 Jan. 92 0 0 1 0 1 9077
Cinoxacin 28 Feb. 92 0 0 0 0 1 6281
Diltiazem Hydrochloride 30 Mar. 92 1 1 0 0 5 439125
Nortriptyline Hydrochloride 30 Mar. 92 1 0 0 1 3 187683
Triamterene 30 Apr. 92 0 0 0 1 2 22092
Piroxicam 29 May 92 1 1 1 0 9 309756
Griseofulvin Ultramicrocrystalline 30 Jun. 92 0 0 0 0 1 11727
Pyrazinamide 30 Jun. 92 0 0 0 0 1 306
Diﬂunisal 31 Jul. 92 0 0 1 0 2 96488
Carbidopa 28 Aug. 92 0 0 1 0 4 117233
Pindolol 03 Sep. 92 1 1 0 1 7 37648
Ketoprofen 22 Dec. 92 0 0 0 0 2 107047
Gemﬁbrozil 25 Jan. 93 1 0 1 0 5 330539
Benzonatate 29 Jan. 93 0 0 0 0 1 2597
Methadone Hydrochloride 15 Apr. 93 0 0 0 0 1 1858
Methazolamide 30 Jun. 93 0 0 0 1 3 4792
Alprazolam 19 Oct. 93 1 1 0 0 7 614593
Nadolol 31 Oct. 93 1 0 0 0 2 125379
Levonorgestrel 13 Dec. 93 0 0 0 0 1 47836
Metoprolol Tartrate 21 Dec. 93 1 1 0 1 9 235625
Naproxen 21 Dec. 93 1 1 1 1 8 456191
Naproxen Sodium 21 Dec. 93 1 1 1 1 7 164771
Guanabenz Acetate 28 Feb. 94 0 0 0 0 2 18120
Triazolam 25 Mar. 94 0 0 0 0 2 71282
Glipizide 10 May 94 1 0 0 0 1 189717
Cimetidine 17 May 94 1 1 0 0 3 547218
Flurbiprofen 20 Jun. 94 1 0 0 0 1 155329
Sulfadiazine 29 Jul. 94 0 0 0 0 1 72
Hydroxychloroquine Sulfate 30 Sep. 94 0 0 0 0 1 8492
Mean 0.45 0.28 0.25 0.25 3.3 126901
Shown is the post-scandal data used in the study. The entry decisions of the four
dominant ﬁrms are indicated by 1 for entry and 0 for no entry. Total Entrants are
how many of the ﬁfty-one potential entrants entered, including the dominant ﬁrms.
Revenue is in thousands of dollars, and is the revenue of the branded product in
the year before patent expiration.
43Table 2. Posterior Distribution: Partial Solution Model
Number of Potential Entrants
(excluding “other” ﬁrms)
Parameter 3 ﬁrms 4 ﬁrms
µc 10.05 10.07
(0.017) (0.0014)
ρc 0.9866 0.9873
(0.00086) (5.6e-05)
σc 0.3721 0.3675
(0.026) (3.0e-04)
κc 0.06655 0.07067
(0.0015) (1.1e-04)
µr 9.906 10.008
(0.083) (0.0037)
σr 1.591 1.682
(0.060) (0.0023)
γ 0.9375 0.9375
β 0.9688 0.9688
pa 0.9375 0.9375
CER ﬁrm 1 0.0857 0.1208
CER ﬁrm 2 0.0788 0.0876
CER ﬁrm 3 0.1038 0.1061
CER ﬁrm 4 0.1374
CER all ﬁrms 0.0894 0.1130
MCMC Reps 3000000 3000000
stride 375 375
Shown is the mode of the multivariate posterior distribution not the modes
of the marginal posterior distributions. The multivariate posterior mode
does correspond to a set of parameter settings that actually occur in the
MCMC chain whereas other measures of central tendency such as the
mean or marginal medians might not. Standard deviations are shown in
parentheses. CER is the classiﬁcation error rate when the parameters
are set to the posterior mode. They are computed at Step 2e of the
importance sampler. At that point in the algorithm the predicted actions
Ai,t,j are known for each ﬁrm i at each time t for each particle j and can
be compared to the observed actions Ao
it. The CER is the the proportion
of the cases where Ao
it  = Ai,t,j computed both by ﬁrm and overall.
44Table 3. Posterior Distribution: Full Solution Model
Number of Potential Entrants
(excluding “other” ﬁrms)
Parameter 3 ﬁrms 4 ﬁrms
µc 10.06 10.07
(0.016) (0.00015)
ρc 0.9877 0.9873
(0.00095) (5.4e-05)
σc 0.3714 0.3676
(0.037) (0.00046)
κc 0.06634 0.0704
(0.0012) (0.00013)
µr 9.941 10.009
(0.064) (0.00037)
σr 1.531 1.682
(0.059) (0.00017)
γ 0.9375 0.9375
β 0.9688 0.9688
pa 0.9375 0.9375
CER ﬁrm 1 0.0861 0.1045
CER ﬁrm 2 0.0786 0.0837
CER ﬁrm 3 0.0971 0.0860
CER ﬁrm 4 0.1351
CER all ﬁrms 0.0873 0.1023
MCMC Reps 3000000 2000000
stride 375 25
Shown is the mode of the multivariate posterior distribution not the modes
of the marginal posterior distributions. The multivariate posterior mode
does correspond to a set of parameter settings that actually occur in the
MCMC chain whereas other measures of central tendency such as the
mean or marginal medians might not. Standard deviations are shown in
parentheses. CER is the classiﬁcation error rate when the parameters
are set to the posterior mode. They are computed at Step 2e of the
importance sampler. At that point in the algorithm the predicted actions
Ai,t,j are known for each ﬁrm i at each time t for each particle j and can
be compared to the observed actions Ao
it. The CER is the the proportion
of the cases where Ao
it  = Ai,t,j computed both by ﬁrm and overall.
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Figure 1. Proﬁle Log Likelihood, Three Firm Model. Shown is the logarithm
of the proﬁle likelihood plotted for a tenth of the posterior standard deviation to the
left and right of the maximum of the likelihood.
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Figure 2. Proﬁle Log Likelihood, Three Firm Model. Shown is the logarithm of
the proﬁle likelihood plotted for 24 posterior standard deviations to the left and right
of the maximum of the likelihood. Points that violate support conditions and points
below 10−6 of the maximum of the likelihood are not plotted. The horizontal line is
at 10−3 of the maximum. The vertical lines indicate the range of the MCMC chain’s
excursions after the transient elements of the chain have died out.
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Figure 3. Proﬁle Log Likelihood, Four Firm Model. Shown is the logarithm of
the proﬁle likelihood plotted for a tenth of a posterior standard deviations to the left
and right of the maximum of the likelihood.
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Figure 4. Proﬁle Log Likelihood, Four Firm Model. Shown is the logarithm of
the proﬁle likelihood plotted for 48 posterior standard deviations to the left and right
of the maximum of the likelihood. Points that violate support conditions and points
below 10−6 of the maximum of the likelihood are not plotted. The horizontal line is
at 10−3 of the maximum. The vertical lines indicate the range of the MCMC chain’s
excursions after the transient elements of the chain have died out.
49Histogram of mu_c
D
e
n
s
i
t
y
10.00 10.02 10.04 10.06 10.08 10.10
0
1
0
2
0
3
0
Histogram of rho_c
D
e
n
s
i
t
y
0.985 0.986 0.987 0.988
0
2
0
0
4
0
0
6
0
0
Histogram of sigma_c
D
e
n
s
i
t
y
0.364 0.366 0.368 0.370 0.372 0.374 0.376 0.378
0
5
0
1
0
0
1
5
0
Histogram of kappa_c
D
e
n
s
i
t
y
0.062 0.064 0.066 0.068 0.070
0
5
0
1
5
0
2
5
0
Histogram of mu_r
D
e
n
s
i
t
y
9.6 9.7 9.8 9.9 10.0 10.1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Histogram of sigma_r
D
e
n
s
i
t
y
1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7
0
2
4
6
8
Figure 5. Marginal Posterior Distributions, Three Firm Model. Shown are
histograms constructed from an MCMC chain for the three ﬁrm model with 3,000,000
repetitions at a stride of 375 for 8000 net. The salient feature of this graphic is the
contrast of the histogram for the parameter κc compared to that shown in Figure 6.
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Figure 6. Marginal Posterior Distributions, Four Firm Model. Shown are
histograms constructed from an MCMC chain for the four ﬁrm model with 1,400,000
repetitions at a stride of 375 for 3733 net. The salient feature of this graphic is the
contrast of the histogram for the parameter κc compared to that shown in Figure 5.
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Figure 7. Cost, Revenue, and Entry Decisions. Plotted as a solid line in the
ﬁrst three panels is the logarithm of cost for the three dominant ﬁrms in the three ﬁrm
model. The logarithm of cost is computed by averaging at Step 2e of the importance
sampler at the maximum likelihood estimate. The circles in these plots indicate that
the ﬁrm entered the market at that time point. The bottom panel shows the logarithm
of total revenue. The numbers at the bottom are the count of the number of dominant
ﬁrms who entered the market at that time point.
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Figure 8. Cost and Entry Decisions of the Dominant Firms. Plotted is the
logarithm of cost for the three dominant ﬁrms. The dashed line is under the three ﬁrm
model, and the solid under the four ﬁrm model. The circles indicate the markets that
Mylan entered, crosses the same for Novopharm, and the asterisks for Lemmon. The
logarithm of cost as described in the legend of Figure 7.
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Figure 9. Actual and Predicted Entry Decisions. Plotted as circles are the
entry decisions of the three dominant ﬁrms in the three ﬁrm model. The crosses are
the average predictions of the three ﬁrm model computed by averaging game solutions
at Step 2e of the importance sampler at the maximum likelihood estimate.
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